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Abstract. KCK is a pyramidal sovereignty structure which ultimate goal seceded from Turkey to 
establish an independent Kurdish state. KCK argues that, its system based on only self-governance, 
but as seen KCK Contract describes new type ‘internal and external’ sovereignty, it can not be 
reconciled with federalism and/or confederalism. In this context, if KCK Contract examined; KCK 
system compared with examples of the federal governments and KCK practices analyzed in southern 
part of Turkey, KCK’s targets can be seen more clearly. In this study KCK system and strategies are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
Group of Communities in Kurdistan, KCK, (Koma Civakên Kurdistan) is an 
umbrella organization comprising Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Party of Free 
Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdistan 
Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK). The Group was established with the acceptance 
of the KCK Contract on 25 May 2010. In fact, KCK is a more comprehensive and 
systematical model than KKK[[1 ]] (Koma Komalen Kurdistan) that was already 
projected by Abdullah Ocalan in 2005.  
The KCK Contract shows the actual aim of the Group is different from self-
governance. The KCK system was first designed to function via regional 
governments. However, it has later become a ‘New State Project’ that aims to 
incorporate state authorities into ‘external sovereignty’.  
The aim of this study is to examine and assess the PKK-KCK relationship 
over the state-sovereignty concept, federative system[[2]], and recent developments 
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in Syria and KCK policies. First, the author will deal the state-sovereignty concept. 
Second, the articles of the KCK Contract will be analyzed. Third, KCK activities in 
Turkey will be given. Fourth, the author will assess how the recent developments in 
Northern Syria have affected KCK’s practices and policies. Last, the author will 
indicate KCK’s real aims and objectives.   
Methodologically, the design of the study is comparative and built on the 
exhibition of KCK’s practices and policies. Thus, footnotes show the comparison of 
international, domestic and legal equivalents of the concepts in and objectives of the 
KCK Contract. Furthermore, the study examines the link between the KCK 
Contract and some policy-makers and municipalities of Democratic Regions Party 
(BDP) and local non-governmental organization.  
 
1. State and Sovereignty 
The definition of the state is necessarily supposed to include three elements: 
Human, territory and sovereignty[3]. These elements are also known as ‘premises’[4]. 
Furthermore, the definition is expected to involve organizational property, 
continuity and legal embodiment of the state. Carl Schmitt defines the state as the 
power that envelopes the entire country. The state is the only mechanism to be able 
to remove all social separation and tension.[5]  
Sovereignty is the superior capability of ruling that the state achieves by the 
total use of the authority over people and territory via legal, political and 
bureaucratic bodies. Furthermore, it may affect and interact autonomously with 
other states and actors in the international arena.[6] 
The definitions show to what extent the concepts of state and sovereignty 
mingle with each other. Sovereignty is a sine qua non for the emergence of the state. 
The separation of sovereignty is associated with the concept of federalism. 
Federalism is the distribution of state power between the federal state and 
federated states in a constitutional system.[7] However, federalism is useful only 
when applied functionally within well-determined borders. The likelihood of success 
of ethnicity-based federations has decreased gradually in the post-1990 period.[8]  
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2. Analysis of KCK Contract 
KCK is a byzantine structure comprising PKK and other relevant terrorist 
and political organizations. Based on armed militant force, the terrorist unit of the 
structure aims to gain land domination within and outside the Turkish borders.[9] 
KCK was organized after Ocalan was arrested in 1999 and it is a part of the 
strategy for politicizing the terrorist organizations. The primary objective is to use 
local political power in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The secondary aim is to 
gain full dominance in these regions by the way of the interaction with local 
Kurdish entities.   
The principles of the 16-section KCK Contract are as follows: 
i. Political dimension: Principles on the establishment, self-
determination and representation of Kurdistan government,  
ii. Sovereignty dimension: Legislative, executive and judicial powers, 
taxation and diplomatic representation, 
iii. Legal dimension: Jurisdiction and civil rights and freedoms, 
iv. Social dimension: Social structuring,  
v. Military dimension: Self-defense forces and locations of PKK and HPG 
(People’s Defense Force), 
vi. Economic/Financial dimension: Structure of economy and finance and 
taxation. 
Article 6 of the preface of the KCK Contract[10] states: 
“For the self-determination of Kurdistan, this movement 
aims not to establish a nationalist state but to establish 
its own democracy that will be grounded on no political 
borders. All Kurds will come together for establishing 
their own federation and unite for confederation in case of 
the emergence of a Kurdish structure in Turkey, Iran, and 
Syria and even in Iraq.” 
Article 6 seems to have no aim of establishing a new state and concentrate 
upon internal self-determination[ 11 ] only.  However, as is understood from the 
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context, the Kurds living in the existing borders will establish their own federation 
and these points clearly to the aim of changing the state’s structure.  
Changing the state’s structure, transition to a federation or confederation, is 
possible only within the constitutional process or through an external intervention 
due to armed struggles and/or only in case of the recognition a separated unit.[12] 
The KCK Contract states that a country-wide referendum or a new and conclusive 
constitution is necessary for the transition of the state’s structure to a federation or 
confederation.[13] Furthermore, the concept of ‘confederal unification of federations’ 
is an undefinable statement in the KCK Contract. In federal states, federated units 
are given no authorities to be in foreign affairs with other states. Internal 
sovereignty is distributed among the units that are supposed to recognize single 
sovereignty in ‘external affairs.’[14] Confederal unification of federations is actually 
an indication of the separation of the country and establishment of a new state. 
“…From now on, three types of law will be valid in 
Kurdistan: EU law, unitary state law and democratic 
confederal law. Kurdistan will recognize the law of Turkey, 
Iran, Syria and Iraq so long as these unitary states 
recognize that of Kurdish people and Kurdish people will 
enter into settlements on this basis.”[15]  
As mentioned above, Article 7 of the preface explains the target legal system 
and structure. This article indicates legal system can be portioned among regions. 
The separation of legal system is a common practice in federations. The limits of 
authority-sharing are very important in legal decentralization. The expression of 
‘Kurdish people’ shows the target is an ethnicity-based legal separation. A 
constitutional amendment is necessary for the federalization of legal structuring 
countrywide. Legal decentralization practices are very common in societies 
organized with various ethnicity- and/or religion-based communities. Such practices, 
especially partially traditional regulations in the religious community’s field of 
interest, are possible within the scope of customary law in limited areas of law.[16] 
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Furthermore, legal decentralization is also common in the countries with ethnic 
problems due to external interventions.  
Other than the determination of the content of ‘Kurdish people’, there is no 
value that is different from those of Turkish society including Kurds as well and 
that Kurds can consider within the context of customary law.  Furthermore, Turkey 
can never be considered to be among the states that may undergo an external 
intervention. The objective of the article is to unite the legal systems of Kurdish 
regions. Thus, they can implement the KCK law independent of Turkish legal 
system in Kurdish regions.  
“KCK is a democratic, political and socialist confederal 
system. … This is a non-state, horizontal and pyramid 
organization. Communities exhibit public will in 
communes, hearths, assemblies and congresses. 
Furthermore, they are self-governed by elected and 
controllable democratic governments. …KCK is based on 
democratic nation in domestic affairs and nation 
superiority in foreign affairs.”[17] 
This section of the KCK Contract has an obvious contradiction in terms, 
mentioning a non-state structure and a horizontal and pyramid organization. 
However, locating the ‘leadership’ at the top of the pyramid will be a one-man 
government. Article 11 of the KCK Contract emphasizes that Ocalan represents all 
Kurds and he is the final decision-making authority[18], referring clearly to a one-
man hierarchy. Furthermore, decentralization, self-governance and nation 
superiority show KCK is beyond an urban structure[ 19 ] and it is actually a 
transregional management model.  
Article 5 on ‘Citizenship of System: Free Citizenship’ and Article 6 on 
‘Citizenship and Denaturalization’ should be examined carefully.  
Article 5: 
“Any person that was born and lives in Kurdistan or 
that is dependent on the KCK system is a citizen. … 
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He possesses the predetermined rights and freedoms 
and performs the obligations determined by this 
contract.” 
Article 6: 
a) “KCK citizens can acquire other citizenship.  
b)  Other nationals asking for KCK citizenship 
must submit necessary informative documents 
to the highest executive body of their regions. 
They acquire KCK citizenship upon the 
relevant body’s decision and approval of 
regional assembly. 
c) He who betrays KCK’s principles and objectives is 
denaturalized upon the decision of Supreme Court of 
Justice and the approval of Kongra Gel.  
d) The demand to cease to be a KCK citizen is 
determined upon the approval of regional assembly 
and Kongra Gel.  
e) All decisions on and procedures for naturalization 
and denaturalization can be appealed.”  
The two articles seem to include no new definitions of citizenship[20]. Article 5 
shows the right of being a KCK citizen is given upon the ‘jus soli’ principle and on 
condition of recognizing the KCK system. Article 6 details the procedures for 
naturalization, denaturalization and the demand to cease to be a KCK citizen. 
Citizenship is a legal status that is dependent on the conditions and cases accepted 
by internal law on the acquisition and loss of citizenship.[21]  At this point, the KCK 
Contract presents a legal definition. Thus, the KCK system aims obviously to 
establish a ‘national law’ that can go beyond the national borders. Permission for 
other citizenship in Article 6 cl. (a) shows that KCK-defined citizenship is different 
from the citizenship duality between federated state and federal center. Under 
normal conditions, the acquisition of more than one nationality is dependent on the 
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internal law of unitary and/or federal states.[22] Federated states are unauthorized 
to decide on the acquisition of other citizenship.[23] As is seen, KCK declares a new 
state independent of Turkey’s sovereignty.  
Article 10 on ‘Fundamental Duties’ cl. (c) defines obligatory military service 
whereas cl. (i) explains that every citizen is a ‘taxpayer’.[ 24 ] However, the 
determination of military service comes within the authority of the central state. 
Furthermore, federated states are granted no authorities to establish their own 
armies even in flexibly-structured federations.  Armed forces and assurance of 
external security are dependent completely on the central authority.[25] In this sense, 
KCK aims to function as an independent state.  
Taxation must be based on constitutional law since it is the part of a mutual 
relationship between the state and citizens. In Turkey, general tax management 
pertains to Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and the government (Council 
of Ministers) in both general and local taxation. Local governments are more 
implementers than decisions-makers in taxation.[ 26 ]  In the KCK Contract, 
unrestricted taxation authority means the transfer of direct central authority to the 
local government. By this way, the KCK management will become a governmental 
system beyond a local government.  
Article 12 defines the status of Kurdish People’s Assembly (Kongra Gelê 
Kurdistan): 
“…Kurdish People’s Assembly is the highest decision-
making (legislative) body of KCK. It functions upon 
an internal regulation based on the terms in the 
KCK Contract.  
… h) Kongra Gel makes decisions about the 
ratification of the agreements with other states and 
international organizations and various communities 
on behalf of KCK.” 
The article shows an assembly function is attributed to Kongra Gel and it is 
authorized to confirm international agreements. Clearly, such authorities of an 
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assembly cannot be considered within the context of federal state and self-
governance. Furthermore, Article 14 s.2 cl. (d) on ‘Foreign Affairs’ mentions the 
diplomatic relation development mechanism. This indicates the authority to use 
external sovereignty belongs to KCK. 
Making international agreements, diplomatic representation and 
establishment of diplomatic relations are reserved within the authority of central 
management in all kinds of states since sub-state units are devoid of international 
legal personality under normal circumstances. However, the Belgium sample is an 
exception because the sub-state unit can sign agreements only in limited cases 
within the scope of its authority. However, the permitted cases are esteemed 
numerus clausus in the constitution.[27] 
“Province-regions are established by separating the 
country according to ethnic-cultural features and 
involved in the system of democratic social 
confederalism on this basis…”  
Article 20 mentions the province-region structure and explains that the 
system of democratic confederalism will be established by the ethno-cultural and 
geographical separation of the country. However, what ‘the country’ refers to is 
unclear: Turkey as a whole or Kurdistan? Dividing the country into states points to 
the establishment of a new independent state.  
Article 27 and 30 focus on the legal system.  
“Judicial independence is the essence of democratic 
people’s justice and represents public decency and 
conscience. The legal system is three-legged: 
Supreme Court of Justice for defending people’s 
dignity and freedoms, Administrative Courts for 
securing the order of discipline and duties and 
People’s Courts for solving public problems. Supreme 
Military Tribunals are in charge of the military 
cases.”[28] 
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The excerpt above show the aim is to establish a legal system beyond that of 
a federated state. In federal states such as USA, all judicial authorities that are not 
granted to the federal government belong to provinces. However, provinces are 
given few authorities due to the broad interpretation of federal authorities.[29] 
Examining the KCK Contract in the context of state, sovereignty and 
federalism, we can notice that a new dependent state sovereignty is described 
clearly. The establishment of a new state is projected from the legislature, law 
system and terms of citizenship to the aim of developing diplomatic relations. The 
KCK structure is in no way connected to decentralization and self-determination. 
The concepts are mingled[30] and ambiguous for concealing the actual aims and 
intentions. However, the actual aim is to divide Turkey. 
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Figure 1: Member Organizations of KCK[31] 
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Figure 2: Organizational Structure of KCK[32] 
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3. KCK Practices 
The local press show KCK practices more clearly and focus on the organic 
relationship between the PKK-KCK-BDP triangle and some local non-governmental 
organizations. Practice strategies of KCK are divided into three as follows: 
i. Practices performed directly by KCK, 
ii. Practices performed over BDP municipalities and, 
iii. Practices performed over local foundations and non-governmental 
organizations.  
KCK is a city-based structure in direct charge of city centers and 
neighborhoods. BDP municipalities can control the relevant city centers and 
neighborhoods easily by means of various non-governmental organizations. The 
BDP-KCK relationship is clearly apparent in BDP’s “Declaration of 2014 Local 
Elections” and “Women’s Declaration of 2014 Local Elections”. The Democratic 
Autonomy Section of the Declaration of Local Elections states as follow:  
“The recognition of the region where Kurds live as 
Kurdistan is critical in democratic autonomy. The 
acceptance of democratic autonomy will set a ground 
for the agreement with the dominant nation-state. 
Democratic autonomy is the minimum condition to 
live together with the dominant nation-state. 
Democratic autonomy will concretize Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan in which the existence of 
Kurds is recognized. This is both a historical and a 
current reality. 
Kurds will actualize their own social freedoms in all 
fields of life from internal security to sports without 
any need for the central state. They will establish 
their internal security by means of the actualization 
of political, social, economic and cultural organization. 
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Thus, the central government will never be expected 
to accept these conditions.”[33] 
Prepared in accordance with the KCK Contract, the declaration focuses firstly 
on the conditions of common life with Turkey. The intrastate region description is 
for concretizing “Geography of Kurdistan”. Later, the declaration places emphasis 
on the establishment of state-independent political, social and military forces. All 
these items are the indicators of the external self-determination and of the aim of 
establishing a new state.  
Women’s Declaration of Local Elections mentions the same point as follow:  
“The central state and AKP government have 
launched a series of operations against KCK shortly 
after the 2009 Local Elections with the aim of 
attacking the paradigmatic level of success that 
Democratic Modernity powers achieved in Kurdistan. 
The primary objectives of these operations are to 
liquidate the success and progress of the Kurdish 
Freedom Movement in the field of local government 
and to exterminate the democratic autonomy model 
developed by the Movement.”[34]  
Women’s Declaration gives the electorate the message that focuses on the 
regional organizational success of KCK. Furthermore, the Declaration seems to 
have determined the KCK System as the template of freedom and “democratic 
autonomy”.  
KCK is apparently well-structured in its sphere of activity and has 
established effectiveness on people. For example, Article 4 of the 8-article 
proclamation released by the KCK Supreme Court of Justice in 24 July 2010 states 
as follow: 
“Those who collaborate with the Turkish government 
and AKP on the policies being implemented in 
Kurdistan commit the offense of treason. Trying to 
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exterminate the existence of a people for individual 
and familial benefits is a serious crime against 
humanity. Those who are the unconscious 
instruments to these policies should criticize 
themselves and abandon these policies immediately. 
HPG will be in charge of exposing sanctions against 
those who are the active parts of the Turkish 
government’s special war policies as long as people 
extermination policies are being implemented 
explicitly in Kurdistan.”[35] 
According to the statement above, Kurds that repudiate KCK are 
coconspirators and involve in a serious crime. Furthermore, it is clearly declared 
that these Kurds can be assaulted by HPG. The objective is to preserve the 
steadiness of the control over the people and intimidate those unwilling to 
participate in the KCK system. 
KCK’s strategy for regional domination is based on; 
i. exercising armed control over locals, 
ii. seizing the control of the region for establishing the ground for 
structuring the administrative body of KCK,  
iii. establishing alternative institution to the state through BDP 
municipalities and non-governmental local organizations and, 
iv. infusing and politicizing locals into the PKK’s ideology via alternative 
institutions and non-governmental organizations and consolidating the 
social ground by this way.  
KCK has exercised armed control in the region in accordance with this 
strategy. Thus, KCK has made local shopkeepers shut down their shops several 
times.[36] 
The KCK/PKK organization has performed joint practices with BDP 
provincial municipalities and built PKK/Guerilla martyrs’ cemeteries in the 
region.[37] The organization collects money from local business people and villagers 
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under the name of “revolution task” for creating fund.[ 38 ] Furthermore, they 
withhold “customs duty” from the smuggled goods into Turkey.[39] KCK Courts are 
in charge of solving the enmities between persons.[40] These courts try any kind of 
cases, especially those over money. The organization receives considerable shares 
from the solution of the cases over money.[41] Furthermore, sources close to KCK 
have reported KCK judges people kidnapped during spot-checks and Kurdish-origin 
people that have rejected collaboration.[42]  
Image 1-2: PKK’s Cemetery and Cemetery’s Gate - Lice[43] 
 
 The KCK/PKK organization attaches special importance to education[44] and 
aims to purge young Kurds of the sense of belonging to Turkey by the calls for 
boycott of national education[ 45 ] and boycott of national days[ 46 ]. Thus, the 
organization attempts to annihilate national education[ 47 ] and format Kurdish 
children and youngsters in line with the objectives and targets of the KCK/PKK.  
Image 3-4: Children in Boycott of Education[48] 
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In the interview published in Azadiya Welat, Cemil Bayik has implied that 
KCK will exercise control over every Kurdish citizen especially in the field of 
education. The following passage is excerpted from the relevant interview.  
“All Kurds must comprehend well what these schools 
are for. The meaning and objectives of these schools 
must be revealed clearly. Those who school their 
children with education in Turkish language will 
experience Kurdish people’s pressure more deeply. In 
such a climate, no citizen will let their children go to 
the Turkish-teaching schools. So to say, they will 
suffer from neighborhood pressure. Now it is time to 
develop such a social attitude and empty the 
schools.”[49] 
BDP municipalities have recently enhanced social, cultural and educational 
activities in line with KCK’s strategies.[ 50 ] “Diyarbakir seems to have made 
remarkable progress on alternative education while Ankara has still been 
discussing over education in the mother-tongue.”[51] stated Can Dündar. Nurseries[52] 
and preschools[53] that provide education in Kurdish language have been established 
as alternatives to those of the Ministry of National Education of Turkey (MEB). The 
following passage is excerpted from the speech by the mayor of Cizre Municipality 
during the inauguration of the nursery, ‘Nubahar Biçûkan’[54], showing clearly that 
these nurseries are for political purpose.  
“We are putting the nursery project into practice so 
that our 3-5-year-old children can get accustomed to 
their mother-tongue. We are opening nurseries and 
preschools to say no to the assimilation policies that 
have been implemented for many years.”[55] 
KURDI-DER (Kurdish Language Research and Development Foundation) 
has prepared elementary school course books in Kurmanji and Zazaki dialects.[56] As 
is understood from the statements of the president of the foundation, Geography 
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course book focuses on ‘Geography of Kurdistan’ consisting of the Kurdish regions in 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria whereas History course book mentions mainly about 
the Kurdish history.[57]  
EDEVs[ 58 ] (Association –Home- for Supporting Education) have been 
established as alternatives to the schools and cram schools dependent on MEB. 
There is no legal barrier to opening EDEVs. EDEVs and reading rooms are 
established by the local council decision.[59] The objectives of EDEV are mentioned 
in Yeni Özgür Politika, a local newspaper, as follow:  
“EDEVs have a special place in the Democratic 
Autonomy Project. Kurdish people will actualize the 
rights of education in mother-tongue and subcultural 
education that the central government abstains 
insistently from granting. In addition to other lessons, 
Kurdish language and Turkish History are taught at 
EDEVs and the objective is to establish the 
framework of education in mother-tongue and put 
this aim into practice without the government’s 
approval. “[60] 
Image 5. Course books in Kurdish[61] 
 
EDEVs’ syllabus[62] is a matter of debate that has even been put on the 
National Assembly’s agenda. A parliamentary question submitted by Oktay Ekşi, 
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Istanbul deputy of Republican People’s Party (CHP), to the Prime Minister asked 
for the information about the number and syllabus of EDEVs.[63] Ecology[64] has 
become a compulsory lesson at EDEV of Baglar Municipality of Diyarbakir.[65] Some 
recent developments in EDEVs have signified these institutions are enculturation 
and politization centers. For example, the employees and students of EDEV of 
Akdeniz Municipality of Mersin that supported the Freedom for Ocalan Signature 
Campaign[66] point to an unusual situation.  
The following passage from the speech of BDP’s co-mayoral candidate for 
Baglar Municipality of Diyarbakir, Birsen Kaya Akat[67], addressing the EDEV 
students during the Nowruz celebrations in Diyarbakir is a clear example of the aim 
of child politicization.  
“We are today struggling severely so that our 
children can live freely with dignity in an 
independent country. We will escalate the struggle 
because our children are our future. We intend to 
bequeath freedom to them. There were Dehaks[ 68 ] 
some centuries ago. Today, the prime minister and 
his junta play the same role.”[69]  
BDP municipalities have established Association for Supporting Women and 
Women’s Houses[70] as alternatives to Provincial Directorate of Social Services and 
Public Education Center with the aim of offering alternatives to the central 
government’s social programs. The attempt to implement KCK’s policies over non-
governmental organizations is another part of the separatist strategy. Non-
governmental organizations are in charge of performing the practices that may pose 
problems when implemented directly by local governments. Some local 
governments’ attempts to establish ‘PKK Museums’ via non-governmental 
organizations can be considered within this direction. For example, in Savur, a 
district of Mardin, Mesopotamia Association of Assistance and Solidarity for 
Families with Lost Relatives[71 ] (MEYA-DER) has attempted to recondition the 
houses where 33 PKK militants were captured dead and convert the houses into a 
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museum with the contribution of BDP’s Savur Municipality[ 72 ]. Organizing 
commemorative[73] activities for PKK militants is another important function of 
these associations and non-governmental organizations.[ 74 ] Thus, civil society 
movements function as political mobilization.  
Image 6. A commemoration notice shared in the social media account of the Dicle-
Firat Culture and Arts Center[75] 
 
Image 7-8: An activity organized in BDP Building by MEYA-DER Regional 
Representation of Yuksekova [76] 
  
Because of the ideological differences; KCK/PKK, tries to overcome the 
difficulties in addressing religious people, via non-governmental organizations and 
associations. Thus, the Party’s tactic of introducing its own religious functionaries 
can be considered to be the first step in establishing an alternative institution to 
Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (DIYANET). The activities organized by the 
Religious Men Aiding and Solidarity Union (DIAYDER) under the name of ‘Civil 
Friday Prayer’[77] can be considered in this direction.[78]  The Union aims to reach 
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the target group over religion and politicize people with ethnic nationalism. 
Furthermore, DIAYDER tries to connect religious people with PKK/KCK by 
rendering religious memorial services (Mawlid) for the deceased PKK militants.[79] 
The following passage is excerpted from the pre-election statements of Altan Tan, a 
deputy candidate of the Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc, suggesting that the 
region be purged from the mosques filled with the imams of DIYANET.  
“The Prime Minister must comprehend it well that 
this square is a symbol of the revolt against 
Kemalism. Prime Minister! Sheikh Said’s 
grandchildren are different from the converted 
around you. Kurds never ask for more rights than 
Allah has already granted them. We will take over 
mosques from the imams who lick Kemalism’s and 
the government’s boots.”[80]  
The strategy for establishing an alternative institution to DIYANET can be 
seen clearly in this context. In the following passage Demir Çelik, Muş deputy and 
vice chairman in charge of BDP’s local governments, summarizes the strategies 
KCK will follow after the 30 March Local Elections. 
“We propose 4 primary fields in the political 
dimension of democratic autonomy: 1) Regional 
government must have a symbol, a flag. However, 
the central government today never recognizes it. We 
will discuss this question in negotiations; 2) we need 
a recognized regional parliament. We have already 
established the council (DTK–Democratic Society 
Congress) that will function as the regional 
parliament. All peoples from every identity express 
themselves freely in this council; 3) regional 
government must have a capital and 4) we will 
establish decentralized governmental bodies such as 
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village communes, neighborhood councils and 
provincial councils by which people will actualize 
self-governance.  
… First of all, we will establish nurseries and 
preschools that give education in mother-tongue. Do 
not let your children learn Turkish at the age of 3 if 
they have not learnt Kurdish well enough from their 
mothers.  
… When we have established democratic autonomy, 
the regional government may establish its own police 
department as a part of self-defense.  
… It is nonsense to be afraid of a piece of fabric. 
Turkish flag is the flag of each of us. We may be 
allergic to it probably because we were compelled to 
recognize it in the past. However, all peoples of 
Turkey represent a 90-year alliance of values. 
Supposing that the country will be separated into 25 
regions, let each region’s own flag and Turkish flag 
fly side by side. This will make us feel honored. On 
the other hand, the ‘You have to recognize my flag 
only!’ attitude denies our existence and it is 
unacceptable.”[81]   
 
4. Developments in Syria and KCK Practices 
Recent developments in Syria can be regarded as the turning point in 
PKK/KCK’s ‘new state project’. PYD has followed a pragmatic policy during the 
Syrian Civil War and preferred being on good terms with Assad. PYD has given no 
support to Syrian separatists and suppressed anti-Assad Kurds.[82] Thus, PYD has 
become stronger in the regions with high Kurdish population.[83]  
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PYD has become the sole authority in Northern Syria since the central Syrian 
government retreated[84] from the northern regions of Syria. PYD is organized in 
governmental agencies and equipped with the weapons already supplied by the 
central government or other sources.[85] PKK militants that were once positioned in 
Turkey and Iraq have recently moved to the northern part of Syria.[86] PYD has 
declared autonomy in Afrin, Jazira and Kobane and attempted to establish a new 
constitution and determine managing bodies.[87] ‘Rojava[88] Social Contract’ has been 
accepted as the framework constitution.[89] The Contract seems to have gone beyond 
its purpose of establishing an autonomous state. The legislature is given the 
authorities to ratify international agreements and treaties, declare war or peace 
and determine general budget.[90] The specified authorities are valid within the 
regional government’s territory although the government appears to recognize 
Syria’s territorial integrity. These developments in Syria have enabled PKK/KCK to 
establish territorial dominance in the region. PKK has put the independence 
process into action via PYD.[91] Thus, KCK has declared the democratic autonomy 
system being implemented[92] in Syria will be put into practice through BDP[93] 
municipalities in Turkey.[ 94 ]  Murat Karayilan has also stated the democratic 
autonomy system in Rojava will be actualized in Turkey as well.[95] Bese Hozat, the 
co-chair of the KCK Executive Council, has defined the 30 March Local Elections as 
the referendum on democratic autonomy and freedom for the leader.[ 96 ] BDP’s 
executives and mayoral candidates have stated clearly that they will implement 
democratic autonomy via their institutions after the elections[97] and will establish a 
common economic zone[98] including Turkey, Syria and Iraq through democratic 
autonomy. In the following passage, Esra Güler Aslan, co-mayoral candidate for 
Sanliurfa’s Ceylanpinar District, states they will attempt to practice the 
autonomous system in Syria directly in Turkey. 
“By favor of democratic autonomy in Rojava, people 
having suffered from oppression for many years have 
today become capable of establishing self-governance 
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via their own institutions. Our primary target is to 
establish a similar system here in Turkey.”[99] 
The “de-facto” situation in Northern Syria has encouraged PKK/KCK to put a 
similar system into action in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey.  
Image 8: Syrian Territory with declared democratic autonomy[100] 
 
 
Conclusion 
We have examined the KCK structure in terms of federalism and 
confederalism with an assessment of KCK’s domestic practices and strategies with 
regard to recent foreign developments. The general results we have obtained are as 
follows: -  
a- KCK is a cross-border structure that aims to separate Turkey into 
regions.  
b- The regions that KCK has incorporated into its span of authority must 
be considered within the scope of state sovereignty. The authorities 
such as legislation, execution and jurisdiction, ratification of 
international agreements, citizenship description and possession of 
military forces are far beyond the intention to transform the unitary 
state structure into federated states in terms of self-governance.  
c- KCK is a ‘new state project’ that is organized via the armed PKK forces 
and BDP municipalities.  
d- KCK aims to govern the region without the control of the central 
government by establishing ethnicity-based institution as alternative 
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to those of the central government and separating education and social 
services. In the long-run, this process will result in miscommunication 
between people from a certain region and others.  
e- Non-governmental organizations are for politicizing the target people 
and used for infusing them into the PKK/KCK ideology.  
f- The de-facto situation in Northern Syria and Turkey’s indecisive 
attitudes have strengthened PKK/KCK in establishing regional 
dominance and attempting to build the KCK system in Turkey as well.  
g- Regional municipal practices are directly related to the establishment 
of ‘democratic autonomy/democratic confederalism’ in line with the 
KCK system.  
h- The KCK system is for establishing a new independent state via 
territorial dominance and internal and external sovereignty.  
In conclusion, KCK is an ethnicity-based separation project aiming to 
establish dominance in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey in the medium 
or long term. KCK is an authoritative-totalitarian system based on PKK’s armed 
forces and it can never be regarded as a democratic structure in favor of self-
governance.  
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